Creating Data Flow Rules through Preferential Trade Agreements

MIRA BURRI

A. Introduction

The critical importance of data for all economic sectors seems nowadays almost uncontested. Beyond the somewhat flawed mantra of data being the ‘new oil’,¹ many studies point to the vast potential of data as an enabler of more efficient business operations, highly innovative solutions and better policy choices in all areas of societal life.² It is noteworthy that this transformative capacity refers not only to ‘digital native’ areas, such as search or social networking, but also to ‘brick-and-mortar’, physical businesses, such as those in manufacturing or logistics.³ The COVID-19 pandemic has further augmented the value of digital transactions and the significance of data-driven platforms.⁴ Emerging technologies, like Artificial Intelligence (AI), which are thought to be in many senses a game-changer,⁵ are also highly dependent on data inputs.⁶ Therefore, solutions in the domain of data governance can in many aspects condition the future of the data-driven economy.

At the same time, as it has been well documented, the increased dependence on data has brought about a set of new concerns. The impact of data collection and use upon privacy has been particularly widely acknowledged by scholars and policy-makers, as well as felt by users of digital products and services in everyday life. Such risks have been augmented in the era of Big Data,⁷ which presents certain distinct challenges to the protection of personal data and by extension to the protection of privacy.⁸ Governments have responded to these concerns in a

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¹ The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.


³ Manyika et al., supra note 2.


⁷ For an introduction on Big Data applications and review of the relevant literature, see Mira Burri, Understanding the Implications of Big Data and Big Data Analytics for Competition Law: An Attempt for a Primer, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPETITION BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 241 (Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor eds., 2019).

⁸ See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11
variety of ways. In terms of external safeguards, states have sought new ways to assert control over data – in particular by prescribing diverse measures that ‘localize’ the data, its storage or suppliers, so as to keep it within the state’s sovereign space. This kind of erecting barriers to data flows, however, does affect trade and may endanger the realization of an innovative data economy, even in a domestic context. In terms of internal safeguards, the preoccupation of the perceived perils of Big Data has triggered the reform of data protection laws around the world, perhaps best exemplified by the efforts of the European Union (EU) to set particularly high standards of protection through the adoption of the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The reform initiatives are, however, not coherent, as they reflect societies’ understandings of constitutional values, relationships between citizens and the state, and the role of the market, to name but a few. The striking divergences, both in the perceptions and the regulation of privacy protection across nations, and the fundamental differences between the human rights approach of the EU and the more market-based, non-interventionist approach of the United States, have also meant that conventional forms of international cooperation and an agreement on shared standards of data protection have become highly unlikely.

Against this backdrop of a complex and contentious regulatory environment, data and cross-border data flows in particular have become one of the relatively new topics in global trade law discussions. With the state at the multilateral forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and despite the current reinvigoration of the e-commerce negotiations, new rule-making has occurred predominantly in preferential trade venues. This chapter aims to shed

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9 See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677 (2015).


15 See, e.g., Nicola & Pollicino, supra note 13.


light on the rules created in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), their evolution over time, and the positioning of the main stake-holders – the EU and the US. The mapping of the new data governance regime in trade agreements, however, should not be contained to these major players. Therefore, the chapter also seeks to provide a more comprehensive mapping of data-related norms, found in other agreements, to help better understand the big picture of the regulatory framework for digital trade, as well as highlight trends in rule-diffusion and their potential implications.  

B. Digital Trade Provisions in PTAs

1. Developments over Time

From the 354 PTAs agreed upon between 2000 and 2021, 195 PTAs have provisions related to digital trade. The largest number of provisions is found in e-commerce and intellectual property (IP) chapters; overall, the provisions remain however highly heterogeneous, addressing an array of different issues ranging from customs duties and paperless trading to personal data protection and cybersecurity. The depth of the commitments and the extent of their binding nature can also vary significantly. Tracing the digital trade provisions along a chronological line, it is evident that the inclusion of provisions in PTAs referring explicitly to electronic commerce started early on (with the 2000 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Jordan and the United States) but recent years mark a significant increase of rule-making in the area of digital trade. As of September 2021, specific provisions applicable to e-commerce can be found in 114 PTAs, mostly in dedicated chapters (84). Among the PTAs with digital trade provisions, it is evident that the number of provisions and the level of their detail have also increased significantly over the years. Meanwhile, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) with its ‘Digital Trade’ chapter is the most comprehensive with 19 articles comprising 3’206 words. The newer dedicated digital trade agreements go well beyond – the US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (DTA) has 22 articles and 5’346 words, and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Chile, Singapore and New Zealand contains 65 articles and 10’887 words.

2. Overview of Data-Related Rules in PTAs

Beyond the unsettled debate on defining ‘digital trade’, one can speak of the relevance of trade rules for data and data flows for at least three reasons – because: (1) they regulate the cross-border flow of data by regulating trade in goods and services as well as the protection of intellectual property; (2) they may install certain beyond the border rules that demand changes in domestic regulation – for example, with regard to procedures with electronic signatures or data protection; and (3) trade law can limit the policy space that regulators have at home. In addition to this generic framework, whose rules are found both in WTO law and in the WTO-plus preferential treaties, the last decade has witnessed the emergence of entirely new rules that

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19 The information stems from our own dataset TAPED: Trade Agreement Provisions on Electronic Commerce and Data. The TAPED dataset is available to all to use and further develop under the creative commons (attribution, non-commercial, share-alike) licence at the University of Lucerne website (https://www.unil.ch/taped). See Mira Burri & Rodrigo Polanco, Digital Trade Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 187 (2020).

20 US-Jordan FTA, art. 7. Almost at the same time, New Zealand and Singapore agreed upon the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), including an article on paperless trading. Two years later, the Australia-Singapore FTA (SAFTA), concluded on 17 February 2003, was the first PTA to have a dedicated chapter on e-commerce.

21 See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 18.

explicitly regulate data flows. Specific data-related provisions are a relatively new phenomenon and can be found primarily in dedicated e-commerce chapters and only in a handful of agreements (see Table 1). The rules refer to both the free cross-border flow of data and to banning or limiting data localization requirements. The next sections focus on these provisions, as well as look at the norms regarding data protection, which may condition the free data flow commitments.

Table 1. Overview of data-related provisions in FTAs (2000–2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Provisions on data flows in e-commerce chapters</th>
<th>Provisions on data localization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soft commitments</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard commitments</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Rules on Data Flows

It is fair to note at the outset that thus far no common definition of data flows exists, despite the wide-spread rhetoric around the term and its frequent use in reports and studies. Nonetheless, although there are variations in treaty language, there seems to be a tendency for a broad definition of data flows (1) where there are bits of information (data) as part of the provision of a service or a product and (2) where this data crosses borders, although the data flows do not neatly coincide with one commercial transaction and the provision of certain service may relate to multiple flows of data. In addition, there has not been a distinction between different types of data – for instance, between personal and non-personal data, personal or company data or machine-to-machine data. However, personal information is commonly included explicitly in

23 Provisions on the cross-border flow of data can however be also found in chapters, dealing with discrete services sectors, where data flows are inherent to the very definition of those services – this is particularly valid for the telecommunications and the financial services sectors.

24 For details, see Mira Burri, Data Flows and Global Trade Law, in BIG DATA AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 11 (Mira Burri ed., 2021).

25 See Casalini & González, supra note 22.

26 As the OECD further clarifies: ‘the actual flow of data reflects individual firm choices: accessing the OECD library from Paris, for instance, actually means contacting a server in the United States (the OECD uses a US-based company for its web services). Id. at 1. Moreover, with the cloud, data can live in many places at once, with files and copies residing in servers around the world.’

27 For instance, Sen classifies data into personal data referring to data related to individuals; company data referring to data flowing between corporations; business data referring to digitised content such as software and audiovisual content; and social data referring to behavioural patterns determined using personal data (see Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of the WTO in International Data Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 323, 343–346 (2018). Aaronson and Leblond categorize data into personal data, public data, confidential business data, machine-to-machine data and metadata, although they do not specifically define each of these terms. See Susan Ariel Aaronson & Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and Its Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245 (2018). The OECD has also tried to break the data into different categories. See OECD, DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Mar. 2019), https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/data-in-the-digital-age.pdf.
the data-related provisions in PTAs,\textsuperscript{28} which may lead to clashes with domestic data protection regimes.

If one looks at the evolution of data flow provisions in PTAs, there has been a major transformation in treaty language over the years. Non-binding provisions on data flows appeared quite early. Already in the 2000 Jordan–US FTA, the Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce highlighted the ‘need to continue the free flow of information’, although no explicit provision in this regard was included. The first agreement having such a provision is the 2006 Taiwan–Nicaragua FTA, where as part of the cooperation activities, the Parties affirmed the importance of working ‘to maintain cross-border flows of information as an essential element to promote a dynamic environment for electronic commerce’.\textsuperscript{29} A stronger commitment can be found in the 2007 South Korea–US FTA, where the Parties stated that they ‘shall endeavor to refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessary barriers to electronic information flows across borders’.\textsuperscript{30}

The first agreement having a binding provision on cross-border information flows is the 2014 Mexico–Panama FTA.\textsuperscript{31} A much more detailed provision in this regard is found in the 2015 amended version of the Pacific Alliance Additional Protocol (PAAP),\textsuperscript{32} which was modelled along the negotiated text of the 2016 Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The TPP text has since then influenced all subsequent agreements having data flows provisions, such as notably the CPTPP and the USMCA\textsuperscript{33} – both endorsing a strong protection of the free flow of data, as discussed in more detail below.

**b) Data Localization**

Recent PTAs have also started to include provisions on data localization, by either banning or limiting requirements of data localization or data use. An important difference with the data flows provisions is that almost all such provisions are binding.\textsuperscript{34} The first agreement with a ban on data localization is the 2015 Japan–Mongolia FTA.\textsuperscript{35} Later the same year, the 2015 amended PAAP, and as strongly influenced by the parallel TPP negotiations, included a similar provision on the use and location of computer facilities.\textsuperscript{36} In 2016, the TPP included a clear ban on

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\textsuperscript{28} It is typically defined as ‘any information, including data, about an identified or identifiable natural person.’ See, e.g., USMCA, art. 19.1.


\textsuperscript{30} Korea-US FTA, art. 15.8 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{31} Mexico-Panama FTA, art. 14.10 states that each Party ‘shall allow its persons and the persons of the other Party to transmit electronic information, from and to its territory, when required by said person, in accordance with the applicable legislation on the protection of personal data and taking into consideration international practices.’

\textsuperscript{32} PAAP, art. 13.11 (2015).

\textsuperscript{33} Such as the 2016 Chile-Uruguay FTA (art. 8.10), the 2016 Updated Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (Chapter 14, art. 13), the 2017 Argentina-Chile FTA (art. 11.6), the 2018 Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA (art. 9.9), the 2018 Australia-Peru FTA (art. 13.11), the 2018 Brazil-Chile FTA (art. 10.12) and the 2019 Australia-Indonesia FTA (art. 13.11).

\textsuperscript{34} See Table 1. One of the few provisions on data localization that are not directly binding is found in the 2017 Argentina-Chile FTA, where the Parties merely recognize the importance of not requiring a person of the other Party to use or locate the computer facilities in the territory of that Party, as a condition for conducting business in that territory and pledge to exchange good practices and current regulatory frameworks regarding servers’ location. See Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 11.7.

\textsuperscript{35} Article 9.10 Japan-Mongolia FTA stipulates that neither Party shall require a service supplier of the other Party, an investor of the other Party, or an investment of an investor of the other Party in the area of the former Party, to use or locate computing facilities in that area as a condition for conducting its business.

\textsuperscript{36} PAAP, art. 13.11bis (2015).
localization, which was then replicated in the CPTPP and the USMCA. The diffusion of these norms is clearly discernible also in subsequent PTAs: among others, the 2016 Chile–Uruguay FTA\(^{37}\) and the 2016 Updated SAFTA,\(^{38}\) which closely follow the CPTPP template.\(^{39}\)

c) **Privacy and Data Protection**

So far, 103 PTAs include binding and non-binding provisions on ‘data protection’ (see Table 2). Yet, the way data is protected varies considerably due to the very different positions of the major actors and the inherent tensions between the regulatory goals of data innovation and data protection.\(^{40}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Overview of privacy-related provisions in PTAs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of provisions 103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soft commitments 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard commitments 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Earlier agreements dealing with privacy issues consist of non-binding declarations. The 2000 Jordan–US FTA Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, for instance, merely declares it necessary to ensure the effective protection of privacy regarding to the processing of personal data on global information networks; yet states also that the means for privacy protection should be flexible and Parties should encourage the private sector to develop and implement enforcement mechanisms, such as guidelines and verification and recourse methodologies, recommending the OECD Privacy Guidelines as an appropriate basis for policy development.\(^{41}\) Similarly, the 2001 Canada–Costa Rica FTA includes a provision on privacy as part of the Joint Statement on Global Electronic Commerce, with both Parties agreeing to share information on the functioning of their respective data protection regimes.\(^{42}\) Later agreements include cooperation activities on enhancing the security of personal data in order to improve the level of protection of privacy in electronic communications and avoid obstacles to trade that requires transfer of personal data.\(^{43}\)

PTAs now increasingly deal with personal data protection with reference to the adoption of domestic standards. While some merely recognize the importance or the benefits of protecting

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37 Chile-Uruguay FTA, art. 8.11.
38 SAFTA, ch. 14, art. 15.
39 Some variations can be found in the 2019 Australia-Indonesia FTA, where a Party may promptly renew a measure in existence at the date of entry into force of the Agreement or amend such a measure to make it less trade restrictive, at any time (art. 13.12(2)). Additionally, the Australia-Indonesia FTA stipulates that nothing in the agreement shall prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining any measure that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (art. 13.12(3)(b)). A second variation is found in the 2018 Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA, the 2018 Australia-Peru FTA and the 2018 Brazil-Chile FTA, which slightly deviate from the CPTPP, as there is no least restrictive measure requirement mentioned. See Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA, art. 9.10; Australia-Peru FTA, art. 13.12; Brazil-Chile FTA, art. 10.13.
43 These activities include sharing information and experiences on regulations, laws and programmes on data protection or the overall domestic regime for the protection of personal information; technical assistance in the form of exchange of information and experts; research and training activities; the establishment of joint programmes and projects; maintaining a dialogue; holding consultations on matters of data protection; or in general, other cooperation mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data.
personal information online,\textsuperscript{44} in several treaties parties specifically commit to adopt or maintain legislation or regulations that protect the personal data or privacy of users,\textsuperscript{45} in relation to the processing and dissemination of data,\textsuperscript{46} which may also include administrative measures,\textsuperscript{47} or the adoption of non-discriminatory practices.\textsuperscript{48} Few agreements include qualifications of this commitment, in the sense that each Party shall take measures it deems appropriate and necessary considering the differences in existing systems for personal data protection,\textsuperscript{49} that such measures shall be developed insofar as possible,\textsuperscript{50} or that the Parties have the right to define or regulate their own levels of protection of personal data in pursuit or furtherance of public policy objectives, and shall not be required to disclose confidential or sensitive information.\textsuperscript{51} Some PTAs add that in the development of online personal data protection standards, each Party shall take into account the existing international standards,\textsuperscript{52} as well as criteria or guidelines of relevant international organizations or bodies\textsuperscript{53} – such as the APEC Privacy Framework and the OECD Guidelines on Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013),\textsuperscript{54} or to accord a high level of protection compatible with the highest international standards in order to ensure the confidence of e-commerce users.\textsuperscript{55} In a handful of treaties, the Parties commit themselves to publishing information on the personal data protection they provide to users of e-commerce,\textsuperscript{56} including how individuals can pursue remedies and how businesses can comply with any legal requirements.\textsuperscript{57} Certain agreements place special

\textsuperscript{44} Australia-Indonesia FTA, art. 13.7(1); Brazil-Chile FTA, arts. 10.2(5)(f), 10.8.1; EU-Japan EPA, art. 8.78(3); Central America-Korea FTA, art. 14.5(1); Canada-Honduras FTA, art. 16.2(2)(e).

\textsuperscript{45} Australia-Indonesia FTA, art. 13.7(2); Brazil-Chile FTA, art. 10.8.2; USMCA, art. 19.8(1)-(2); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 13.8(1)-(2); Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA, art. 9.7(1)-(2); Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 11.5(1)-(2); CETA, art. 16.4; Australia-Singapore FTA, Ch. 14, art. 9.1-2 (2016); Chile-Uruguay FTA, art. 8.7(1)-(2); TPP/CPTPP, art. 14.8(1)-(2); Singapore-Turkey FTA, art. 9.7(1)-(2); China-Korea FTA, art. 13.5; EAEU-Vietnam FTA, art. 13.5; Korea-Vietnam FTA, art. 10.6(1); Japan-Mongolia FTA, art. 9.6(3); Australia-Japan FTA, art. 13.8(1); Australia-Korea FTA, art. 15.8; Mexico-Panama FTA, art. 14.8; PAAP, art. 13.8(1); Colombia-Panama FTA, art. 19.6; New Zealand-Taiwan FTA, ch. 9, art. 2(d)(i); Colombia-Korea FTA, art. 12.3; Chile-China FTA, art. 55 (2018); Australia-Malaysia FTA, art. 15.8(1); Canada-Columbia FTA, art. 1506.1.

\textsuperscript{46} Central America-EFTA, annex II, art. 1(c)(i); EFTA-GCC FTA, annex XVI, article 1(c)(i); EFTA-Colombia FTA, annex I, art. 1(c)(i); EFTA-Peru FTA, annex I, art. 1(c)(i).

\textsuperscript{47} Colombia-Costa Rica FTA, art. 16.6(1); Korea-Peru FTA, art. 14.7; Hong Kong-New Zealand FTA, ch. 10, art. 2.1(f); ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, ch. 10, art. 7.1-2; Australia-Chile FTA, art. 16.8; Canada-Peru FTA, art. 1507.

\textsuperscript{48} Australia-Indonesia FTA, art. 13.6(3); Brazil-Chile FTA, art. 10.8(3); USMCA, art. 19.8(4); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 13.8(3); Australia-Chile FTA, art. 11.5(3); Australia-Singapore FTA, ch. 14, art. 9.3 (2016); TPP/CPTPP, art. 14.8(3).

\textsuperscript{49} Australia-China FTA, art. 12.8(1); Chile-Thailand FTA, art. 11.7(1)(j); Australia-Singapore FTA, ch. 14, art. 7.1 (2003).

\textsuperscript{50} Colombia-Israel FTA, annex-B, art. 3.

\textsuperscript{51} EU-Japan EPA, arts. 18.1(2)(h), 18.16(7).

\textsuperscript{52} EC-Singapore FTA, art. 8.57(4); Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 11.5(1)-2; Chile-Uruguay FTA, art. 8.7(2).

\textsuperscript{53} Australia-Indonesia FTA, art. 13.7(3); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 13.8(2); CETA, art. 16.4; Australia-Singapore FTA, ch. 14, art. 9.2 (2016); TPP/CPTPP, art. 14.8(2); Australia-China FTA, art. 12.8(2); Korea-Vietnam FTA, art. 10.6(2); Australia-Japan FTA, art. 13.8(2); EC-Ukraine AA, art. 139.2; EC-Georgia AA, art. 127.2; Australia-Korea FTA, art. 15.8; Mexico-Panama FTA, art. 14.8; Chile-Thailand FTA, art. 11.7(j); Colombia-Panama FTA, art. 19.6; Colombia-Costa Rica FTA, art. 16.6(1); Colombia-Korea FTA, arts. 12.1(2), 12.3; EU-Central America FTA, art. 201.2; Australia-Malaysia FTA, art. 15.8(2); ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, Ch. 10, art. 7.3; Australia-Chile FTA, art. 16.8; New Zealand-Thailand FTA, art. 10.5; Australia-Thailand FTA, art. 1106; Australia-Singapore FTA, ch. 14, art. 7.2 (2003).

\textsuperscript{54} USMCA, art. 19.8(2).

\textsuperscript{55} Armenia-EU CEPA, art. 197.2; Colombia-EC-Peru FTA, art. 162.2; Chile-EC AA, Chile-EC AA 119.2; CARIFORUM-EC EPA, art. 202.

\textsuperscript{56} Brazil-Chile FTA, art. 10.8(4).

\textsuperscript{57} USMCA, art. 19.8(5); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 13.8(4); Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA, art. 9.7(3); Australia-
emphasis on the transfer of personal data, stipulating that it shall only take place if necessary for the implementation, by the competent authorities, of agreements concluded between the Parties, or that the countries need to have an adequate level of safeguards for the protection of personal data. Some treaties add that the Parties will encourage the use of encryption or security mechanisms for the personal information of the users, and their dissociation or anonymization, in cases where said data is provided to third parties.

PTA Parties have also employed more binding options to protect personal information online. A first option is to consider the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records as an exception in specific chapters of the agreement—such as for trade in services, investment or establishment, movement of persons, telecommunications and financial services. Certain agreements, mostly EU-led, have dedicated chapters on protection of personal data, including the principles of purpose limitation, data quality and proportionality, transparency, security, right to access, rectification and opposition, restrictions on onward transfers, and protection of sensitive data, as well as provisions on enforcement mechanisms, coherence with international commitments and cooperation between the Parties in order to ensure an adequate level of protection of personal data. The 2018 USMCA was the first US-led PTA to include such a provision that recognizes key principles of data protection.

A second option lets countries adopt appropriate measures to ensure the privacy protection while allowing the free movement of data, establishing a criterion of ‘equivalence’. This has been largely the EU approach and to that end, Parties also commit to inform each other of their applicable rules and negotiate reciprocal, general or specific agreements. A third, but less used option, leaves the development of rules on data protection to a treaty body.

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58 EC-Moldova AA, art. 13.2.
59 Korea-Vietnam FTA, art. 10.6(2).
60 Brazil-Chile FTA, art. 10.8(6); Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 11.5(6); Chile-Uruguay FTA, art. 8.7(5).
61 Japan-Singapore FTA, art. 69.1(c).
62 Chile-EC AA, art. 135.1(c)(ii); Japan-Singapore FTA, art. 83.1(c)(ii).
63 Japan-Singapore FTA, art. 95.1(c)(ii).
64 USMCA, art. 18.3(4); EU-Japan EPA, art. 8.44(4); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 12.4(4); Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA, art. 8.3(4); Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 10.3(4); Australia-Singapore FTA, art. 10.3(4) (2016); Singapore-Turkey FTA, art. 8.3(5); Japan-Mongolia FTA, annex 5, art. 3; Korea-Peru FTA, art. 13.3(4); Panama-US FTA, art. 13.2(4); Japan-Switzerland FTA, annex VI, art. IX(a); Nicaragua-Taiwan FTA, art. 13.02(4); Korea-Singapore FTA, art. 11.3(4); Morocco-US FTA, art. 13.2(4)(b); Chile-US FTA, art. 13.2(4).
65 USMCA, annex 17-A; EU-Japan EPA, art. 8.63; EU-Vietnam FTA, art. 8.45; EC-Singapore FTA, art. 8.54(2); Australia-Peru FTA, art. 10.21; Armenia-EU CEPA, art. 185; CETA, art. 13.15(4); Australia-Singapore FTA, annex 9-B (2016); TPP/CPTPP, annex 11-B, Singapore-Turkey FTA, art. 10.12; Japan-Mongolia FTA, annex 4, art. 11; EC-Ukraine AA, art. 129; EC-Georgia AA, art. 118.2; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA, ch. 10, Annex on Financial Services, art. 7.2; Japan-Switzerland FTA, annex VI, art. VIII; EFTA-Colombia FTA, annex XVI - financial services, art. 8; EC-Moldova AA, art. 245; Chile-EC AA, art. 135.1(c)(ii).
66 Cameroon-EC Interim EPA, ch. 6, arts. 61–65; CARIFORUM-EC EPA, ch. 6, arts. 197–201. Other agreements merely recognize principles for the collection, processing and storage of personal data such as: prior consent, legitimacy, purpose, proportionality, quality, safety, responsibility and information, but without developing this in detail: Argentina-Chile FTA, art. 11.2(5)(f) n.1; Chile-Uruguay FTA, art. 8.2(5)(f) n.3.
67 USMCA, art. 19.8(3); see also below.
68 EC-Singapore FTA, art. 8.54(2); EU-Singapore FTA, Understanding 3 - Additional Customs-Related Provisions, arts. 9.2, 11.1; EC-Ghana EPA, Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Custom Matters, art. 10; Bosnia and Herzegovina-EC SAA, Protocol 5 on Mutual Administrative Assistance on Custom Matters, art. 10.2; Algeria EC Euro-Med Association Agreement, art. 45 & Protocol No. 7.
C. Different PTA Templates for Digital Trade Governance

As evident from the above overview, the regulatory environment for data flows has been shaped by PTAs. The United States has played a key role in this process and has sought to endorse liberal rules in implementation of its ‘Digital Agenda’. The emergent regulatory template on digital issues is not however limited to US agreements but has diffused and can be found in other PTAs, as evident from the above overview. Despite the fact that there are still great variations in treaty language, certain distinct templates have been developed in recent years – one such template is shaped along the TPP model and now endorsed in the CPTPP and a number of subsequent agreements. The other and more recent model for digital trade has been promoted by the European Union. The next sections look first at the CPTPP and its variations under the USMCA, the DTA and the DEPA; then the new EU template and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are explored.

3. The US Template

a) The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership

The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) was agreed upon in 2017 between eleven countries in the Pacific Rim and entered into force on 30 December 2018. Beyond the overall economic impact of the CPTPP, its chapter on e-commerce created the most comprehensive template in the landscape of PTAs and included several new features. Despite the fact that US has dropped out of the agreement with the start of the Trump administration, the chapter still reflects the US efforts to secure obligations on digital trade and is a verbatim reiteration of the TPP chapter.

Particularly interesting for this chapter’s discussion are the provisions found in the CPTPP e-commerce chapter that tackle the emergent issues of the data economy, previously unaddressed under the WTO framework. Most importantly, the CPTPP explicitly seeks to restrict the use of data protectionist measures. Article 14.13(2) prohibits the parties from requiring a ‘covered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Party’s territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory’. The soft language from US–South Korea FTA on free data flows is now also framed as a hard rule: ‘[e]ach Party shall allow the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, including personal information, when this activity is for the conduct of the business of a covered person’. The rule has a broad scope and most data transferred over the Internet is likely to be covered, although the word ‘for’ may suggest the need for some causality between the flow of data and the business of the covered person; the explicit of personal data is also noteworthy.

Measures restricting digital flows or implementing localization requirements are permitted only if they do not amount to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade’ and do not ‘impose restrictions on transfers of information greater than are required to achieve the objective’. These non-discriminatory conditions are similar to the strict test formulated by Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT 1994 – a test that is aimed at balancing trade and non-trade interests by ‘excusing’ certain violations (but is also extremely

69 See Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the US: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Liberalization, 58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 7 (2003). The agreements reached since 2002 with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, Peru, Singapore, the Central American countries, Panama, Colombia and South Korea, all contain critical WTO-plus (going above the WTO commitments) and WTO-extra (addressing issues not covered by the WTO) provisions in the broader field of digital trade.
70 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
71 CPTPP, art. 14.11(2) (emphasis added).
72 Id. art. 14.11(3).
hard to pass, as we know from existing WTO jurisprudence).\textsuperscript{73} The CPTPP test differs from the WTO norms in one significant element: while there is a list of public policy objectives in GATT and GATS, the CPTPP provides no such enumeration and speaks merely of a ‘legitimate public policy objective’.\textsuperscript{74} This permits more regulatory autonomy for the CPTPP signatories, but may lead to legal uncertainty. Further, it should be noted that the ban on localization measures is softened with regard to financial services and institutions.\textsuperscript{75} An annex to the ‘Financial Services’ chapter has a separate data transfer requirement, whereby certain restrictions on data flows may apply for the protection of privacy or confidentiality of individual records, or for prudential reasons.\textsuperscript{76} Government procurement is also excluded.\textsuperscript{77} Both exclusions are typical for all PTAs.

One of other novel issues that the CPTPP addresses deals with source code. Pursuant to Article 14.17, a CPTPP Member may not require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another Party as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products containing such software, in its territory. The prohibition applies only to mass-market software or products containing such software.\textsuperscript{78} This means that tailor-made products are excluded, as well as software used for critical infrastructure and those in commercially negotiated contracts.\textsuperscript{79} This provision aims to protect software companies and address their concerns about loss of intellectual property, in particular trade secrets protection, or cracks in the security of their proprietary code; it may also be interpreted as a reaction to China’s demands to access to source code from software producers selling in its market.

Overall, these provisions illustrate an interesting development because it is evident that they do not simply entail a clarification of existing bans on discrimination, nor do they merely set higher standards, as is anticipated from trade agreements. Rather, they shape the regulatory space domestically. An important rule in this regard is in the area of privacy and data protection. Article 14.8(2) requires every CPTPP party to ‘adopt or maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection of the personal information of the users of electronic commerce’. Yet, there are no standards or benchmarks for the legal framework specified, except for a general requirement that CPTPP parties ‘take into account principles or guidelines of relevant international bodies’.\textsuperscript{80} A footnote provides some clarification in saying that: ‘… a Party may comply with the obligation in this paragraph by adopting or maintaining measures such as a comprehensive privacy, personal information or personal data protection laws, sector-specific laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for the enforcement of voluntary undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy’.\textsuperscript{81}

Parties are also invited to promote compatibility between their data protection regimes, by essentially treating lower standards as equivalent.\textsuperscript{82} The goal of these norms can be interpreted as a prioritization of trade over privacy rights. This has been pushed by the US during the TPP

\textsuperscript{74} CPTPP, art. 14.11(3).
\textsuperscript{75} For the definition of ‘a covered person’, see id. art. 14.1, which excludes a ‘financial institution’ and a ‘cross-border financial service supplier.’
\textsuperscript{76} The provision reads: ‘Each Party shall allow a financial institution of another Party to transfer information in electronic or other form, into and out of its territory, for data processing if such processing is required in the institution’s ordinary course of business.’
\textsuperscript{77} CPTPP, art. 14.8(3).
\textsuperscript{78} Id. art. 14.17(2).
\textsuperscript{79} Id.
\textsuperscript{80} Id. art. 14.8(2).
\textsuperscript{81} Id. art. 14.8(2) n.6.
\textsuperscript{82} Id. art. 14.8(5).
Creating Data Flow Rules through PTAs

negotiations, as the US subscribes to relatively weak and patchy protection of privacy. Timewise, this push came also at the phase, when the US was wary that it could lose the privilege of transatlantic data transfer, as a consequence of the judgment of the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) that struck down the EU–US Safe Harbor Agreement, which in hindsight had been a legitimate concern considering the 2020 follow-up decision of Schrems II.

Next to the data protection norms, the CPTPP includes also provisions on consumer protection and spam control. These are however fairly weak. The same is true for the newly introduced rules on cybersecurity. Article 14.16 is non-binding and identifies a limited scope of activities for cooperation, in situations of ‘malicious intrusions’ or ‘dissemination of malicious code’, and capacity-building of governmental bodies dealing with cybersecurity incidents.

b) The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and the United States–Japan Digital Trade Agreement

The renegotiated NAFTA, which is now referred to as the ‘United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement’ (USMCA), has a comprehensive e-commerce chapter, which is now also properly titled ‘Digital Trade’. The chapter follows all critical lines of the CPTPP and goes beyond it. In particular, the USMCA adheres to the CPTPP model with regard to data issues and ensures the free flow of data through a clear ban on data localization and incorporates a hard rule on free information flows. Article 19.11 specifies further that parties can adopt or maintain a measure inconsistent with the free flow of data provision, if this is necessary to achieve a legitimate public policy objective, provided that there is no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination nor a disguised restriction on trade; and the restrictions on transfers of information are not greater than necessary to achieve the objective.

Beyond these similarities, the USMCA introduces some novelties. The first one is that the USMCA departs from the standard US approach and signals abiding to some data protection principles and guidelines of relevant international bodies. After recognizing ‘the economic and social benefits of protecting the personal information of users of digital trade and the contribution that this makes to enhancing consumer confidence in digital trade’, Article 19.8 requires from the parties to ‘adopt or maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection of the personal information of the users of digital trade. In the development of its legal framework for the protection of personal information, each Party should take into account principles and guidelines of relevant international bodies, such as the APEC Privacy

83 Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Prot. Comm’r, EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015). Maximillian Schrems is an Austrian citizen, who filed a suit against the Irish supervisory authority, after it rejected his complaint over Facebook’s practice of storing user data in the US. The plaintiff claimed that his data was not adequately protected in light of the NSA revelations and this, despite the existing agreement between the EU and the US – the so-called ‘safe harbor’ scheme.
84 The later EU-US ‘privacy shield’ arrangement, which replaced the Safe Harbor, was also rendered invalid by a recent judgment: Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’t v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximillian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
85 CPTPP, art. 14.17.
86 Id. art. 14.14.
87 USMCA, art. 19.12.
88 Id. art 19.11.
89 Id. art 19.11(2). There is a footnote attached, which clarifies: A measure does not meet the conditions of this paragraph if it accords different treatment to data transfers solely on the basis that they are cross-border in a manner that modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of service suppliers of another Party. The footnote does not appear in the CPTPP treaty text.
90 Id. art 19.8(1).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3910408
Framework and the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013). The parties also recognize key principles of data protection, which include: limitation on collection; choice; data quality; purpose specification; use limitation; security safeguards; transparency; individual participation; and accountability, and aim to provide remedies for any violations. This is a key development because the USMCA may go beyond what the US may have in its national laws on data protection and also reflects some of the principles the European Union has advocated for in the domain of personal data protection. One may wonder whether this is a development caused by the so-called ‘Brussels effect’, whereby the EU ‘exports’ its own domestic standards and renders them globally applicable, or whether we are seeing a shift in US privacy protection regimes.

Three further novelties of the USMCA may be mentioned. The first refers to the inclusion of ‘algorithms’, the meaning of which is ‘a defined sequence of steps, taken to solve a problem or obtain a result’ and has become part of the ban on requirements for the transfer or access to source code in Article 19.16. The second novum refers to the recognition of ‘interactive computer services’ as particularly vital to the growth of digital trade. Parties pledge in this sense not to ‘adopt or maintain measures that treat a supplier or user of an interactive computer service as an information content provider in determining liability for harms related to information stored, processed, transmitted, distributed, or made available by the service, except to the extent the supplier or user has, in whole or in part, created, or developed the information’. This provision is important, as it seeks to clarify the liability of intermediaries and delineate it from the liability of host providers with regard to IP rights’ infringement. It also secures the application of Section 230 of the US Communications Decency Act, which insulates platforms from liability but has been recently under attack in many jurisdictions in the face of fake news and other negative developments related to platforms’ power. While the safe harbor is very much to the benefit of US tech companies, it has stirred controversies in the US as well, with Nancy Pelosi arguing against its inclusion. It remains to be seen whether future US trade deals, struck under the Biden administration, will also include this limited platforms’ liability.

91 Id. art. 19.8(2).
92 Id. art. 19.8(3).
93 Id. art. 19.8(4)-(5).
95 See Chander et al., supra note 13.
96 USMCA, art. 19.1.
97 Id. art. 19.17(2). Annex 19-A creates specific rules with the regard to the application of art. 19.17 for Mexico, in essence postponing its implementation for three years.
99 Section 230 reads: ‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’ and in essence protects online intermediaries that host or republish speech.
101 For literature review, see, e.g., Mira Burri, Fake News in Times of Pandemic and Beyond: An Enquiry into the Rationales for Regulating Information Platforms, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS (Klaus Mathis & Avishalom Tor, eds. 2022).
The third and rather liberal commitment of the USMCA parties regards open government data. This is truly innovative and very relevant in the domain of domestic regimes for data governance. In Article 19.18, the parties recognize that facilitating public access to and use of government information fosters economic and social development, competitiveness, and innovation. ‘To the extent that a Party chooses to make government information, including data, available to the public, it shall endeavor to ensure that the information is in a machine-readable and open format and can be searched, retrieved, used, reused, and redistributed’.103 There is in addition an endeavour to cooperate, so as to ‘expand access to and use of government information, including data, that the Party has made public, with a view to enhancing and generating business opportunities, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises’.104

The US approach towards digital trade issues has been confirmed also by the recent US–Japan Digital Trade Agreement (DTA), signed on 7 October 2019, alongside the US–Japan Trade Agreement.105 The US–Japan DTA arguably replicates almost all provisions of the USMCA and the CPTPP.106 It incorporates the new USMCA rules on open government data,107 source code108 and interactive computer services109 but notably covering also financial and insurance services as part of the scope of agreement, thereby rendering its impact much broader. A new provision has been added with regard to ICT goods that use cryptography. Article 21 DTA specifies that for such goods designed for commercial applications, neither party shall require a manufacturer or supplier of the ICT good as a condition to entering the market to: (a) transfer or provide access to any proprietary information relating to cryptography; (b) partner or otherwise cooperate with a person in the territory of the Party in the development, manufacture, sale, distribution, import, or use of the ICT good; or (c) use or integrate a particular cryptographic algorithm or cipher.110 This rule is similar to Annex 8-B, Section A.3 of the CPTPP chapter on technical trade barriers. It is a reaction to a practice by several countries, in particular China, that impose direct bans on encrypted products or set specific technical regulations that restrict the sale of encrypted products, and caters for the growing concerns of large companies, like IBM and Microsoft, that thrive on data flows with less governmental intervention.111

Other minor differences that can be noted when comparing with the USMCA are some things missing in the US–Japan DTA – such as rules on paperless trading, net neutrality and the mention of data protection principles.112 The exceptions attached to the US–Japan DTA refer

103 USMCA, art. 19.18(2).
104 Id. art. 19.8(3).
107 US–Japan DTA, art. 20.
108 Id. art. 17.
109 Id. art. 18. A side letter recognizes the differences between the US and Japan’s systems governing the liability of interactive computer services suppliers and parties agree that Japan need not change its existing legal system to comply with art. 18.
110 Id. art. 21.3.
112 Art. 15 merely stipulates that parties shall adopt or maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection
to the WTO general exception clauses of Article XIV of the GATS and Article XX of the GATT 1994, whereby the parties agree to their *mutatis mutandis* application. Further exceptions are listed with regard to security, prudential and monetary and exchange rate policy, and taxation, which are to be linked to the expanded scope of agreement including financial and insurance services.

c) The DEPA

The 2020 Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, all parties also to the CPTPP, should be mentioned as a new type of digital trade agreement, as it is not conceptualized as a purely trade deal but one that is meant to address the broader issues of the digital economy. In this sense, its scope is wide, open and flexible and covers several emergent issues, such as those in the areas of AI and digital inclusion. The agreement is also not a closed deal but one that is open to other countries and the DEPA is meant to complement the WTO negotiations on e-commerce and build upon the digital economy work underway within APEC, the OECD and other international forums. DEPA follows a modular approach and the type of rules varies across the different modules. On the one hand, all rules of the CPTPP are replicated, some of the USMCA rules, such as the one on open government data (but not source code), and some of the US–Japan DTA provisions, such as the one on ICT goods using cryptography, have been included too.

On the other hand, there are many other so far unknown to trade agreement rules that try to facilitate the functioning of the digital economy and enhance cooperation on key issues. For instance, Module 2 on business and trade facilitation includes next to the standard CPTPP-like norms, additional efforts ‘to establish or maintain a seamless, trusted, high-availability and secure interconnection of each Party’s single window to facilitate the exchange of data relating to trade administration documents, which may include: (a) sanitary and phytosanitary certificates and (b) import and export data’. Parties have also touched upon other important issues around digital trade facilitation, such as electronic invoicing (Article 2.5); express shipments and clearance times (Article 2.6); logistics (Article 2.4) and electronic payments (Article 2.7). Module 8 on emerging trends and technologies is also particularly interesting to mention, as it highlights a range of key topics that demand attention by policymakers, such as in the areas of fintech and AI.

With respect to AI, the parties agree to promote the adoption of ethical and governance frameworks that support the trusted, safe, and responsible use of AI technologies, and in

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of the personal information of the users of digital trade and publish information on the personal information protection, including how: (a) natural persons can pursue remedies; and (b) an enterprise can comply with any legal requirements.

113 US–Japan DTA, art. 3.
114 Id. art. 4.
115 Id. art. 5.
116 Id. art. 6.
118 DEPA, art. 16.2.
119 Id. art. 9.4.
120 Id. art. 3.4. The article also provides detailed definitions of cryptography, encryption, and cryptographic algorithm and cipher.
121 Id. art. 2.2 (Paperless Trading); id. art. 2.3 (Domestic Electronic Transactions Framework).
122 Id. art. 2.2(5). ‘Single window’ is defined as a facility that allows Parties involved in a trade transaction to electronically lodge data and documents with a single-entry point to fulfil all import, export and transit regulatory requirements. Id. art. 2.1.
adopting these AI Governance Frameworks parties would seek to follow internationally-recognized principles or guidelines, including explainability, transparency, fairness, and human-centered values.123 The DEPA parties also recognize the interfaces between the digital economy and government procurement and broader competition policy and agree to actively cooperate on these issues.124 Along this line of covering broader policy matters to create an enabling environment that is also not solely focused on and driven by economic interests, the DEPA deals with the importance of a rich and accessible public domain125 and digital inclusion, which can cover enhancing cultural and people-to-people links, including between indigenous peoples, and improving access for women, rural populations, and low socio-economic groups.126

Overall, the DEPA is a unique and future-oriented project that covers well the broad range of issues that the digital economy impinges upon and offers a good basis for harmonization and interoperability of domestic frameworks and international cooperation that adequately takes into account the complex challenges of contemporary data governance that has essential trade but also non-trade elements. Its attractiveness as a form of enhanced cooperation on issues of data-driven economy has been confirmed by Canada’s127 and South Korea’s128 interest to join it. The DEPA’s modular approach has been also followed in the Australia-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement, which is however still linked to the trade deal between the parties.129

4. The Digital Trade Agreements of the European Union

Apart from the generic differences between the EU and the US approaches to PTAs, the EU template with regard to digital trade is not as coherent as that of the United States.130 It has also developed and changed over time. This can be explained by the EU’s newly put stress on digital technologies as part of its innovation and growth strategy and with its new foreign policy orientation subsequent to the Lisbon Treaty, which includes PTAs as an essential strategic element.131

The agreement with Chile (signed in 2002) was the first to include substantial e-commerce provisions but the language was still cautious and limited to soft cooperation pledges in the services chapter132 and in the fields of information technology, information society and telecommunications.133 In more recent agreements, such as the EU–South Korea's Agreement, which is however still linked to the trade deal between the parties.

123 Id. art. 8.2(2)-(3).
124 Id. arts. 8.3-8.4.
125 Id. art. 9.2.
126 Id. art. 11.2.
128 ‘South Korea Starts Process to Join DEPA’, 6 October 2021, available at: https://en.vna.co.kr/view/PYH20211006124000325
130 EU PTAs tend, for instance, to cover more WTO-plus areas but have less liberal commitments. For detailed analysis, see HENRIK HORN ET AL., BEYOND THE WTO? AN ANATOMY OF EU AND US PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (2009), https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/bp_trade_jan09.pdf.
132 EU–Chile FTA, art. 102. The agreement states that ‘[t]he inclusion of this provision in this Chapter is made without prejudice of the Chilean position on the question of whether or not electronic commerce should be considered as a supply of services.’
133 Id. art. 37.
in 2009), the language is much more concrete and binding. It imitates some of the US template provisions and confirms the applicability of the WTO Agreements to measures affecting electronic commerce, as well as subscribes to a permanent duty-free moratorium on electronic transmissions. The EU, as particularly insistent on data protection policies, has also sought commitment of its FTA partners to compatibility with the international standards of data protection. The EU, as particularly insistent on data protection policies, has also sought commitment of its FTA partners to compatibility with the international standards of data protection.134 Cooperation is also increasingly framed in more concrete terms and includes mutual recognition of electronic signatures certificates, coordination on Internet service providers’ liability, consumer protection, and paperless trading.135

The 2016 EU agreement with Canada – the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) – goes a step further. The CETA provisions concern commitments ensuring (a) clarity, transparency and predictability in their domestic regulatory frameworks; (b) interoperability, innovation and competition in facilitating electronic commerce; as well as (c) facilitating the use of electronic commerce by small and medium sized enterprises.136 The EU has succeeded in deepening the privacy commitments and the CETA has a specific norm on trust and confidence in electronic commerce, which obliges the parties to adopt or maintain laws, regulations or administrative measures for the protection of personal information of users engaged in electronic commerce in consideration of international data protection standards.137 Yet, there are no deep commitments on digital trade; nor there are any rules on data flows.

Overall, the EU has been cautious when inserting rules on data in its free trade deals and presently none of its treaties has such rules of binding nature. It is only recently that the EU has made a step towards such rules, whereby Parties have agreed to consider in future negotiations commitments related to cross-border flow of information. Such a clause is found in the 2018 EU–Japan EPA,138 and in the modernization of the trade part of the EU–Mexico Global Agreement. In the latter two agreements, the Parties commit to ‘reassess’ within three years of the entry into force of the agreement, the need for inclusion of provisions on the free flow of data into the treaty. This signalled a repositioning of the EU on the issue of data flows, which is now fully endorsed in the EU’s currently negotiated deals with Australia,139 New Zealand140 and Tunisia,141 which include in their draft digital trade chapters norms on the free flow of data and data localization bans. This repositioning and newer commitments are however also linked with high levels of data protection.142

The EU wishes to permit data flows only if coupled with the high data protection standards of its GDPR. In its currently negotiated trade deals, as well as in the EU proposal for WTO rules on electronic commerce,143 the EU follows a distinct model of endorsing and protecting privacy

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134 EU–South Korea FTA, art. 7.48.
135 Id. art. 7.49.
136 CETA, art. 16.5.
137 Id. art. 16.4.
138 EU–Japan EPA, art. 8.81.
as a fundamental right. On the one hand, the EU and its partners seek to ban data localization measures and subscribe to a free data flow but on the other hand, these commitments are conditioned: first, by a dedicated article on data protection, which clearly states that: ‘Each Party recognises that the protection of personal data and privacy is a fundamental right and that high standards in this regard contribute to trust in the digital economy and to the development of trade’, followed by a paragraph on data sovereignty: ‘Each Party may adopt and maintain the safeguards it deems appropriate to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy, including through the adoption and application of rules for the cross-border transfer of personal data. Nothing in this agreement shall affect the protection of personal data and privacy afforded by the Parties’ respective safeguards’.

The EU also wishes to retain the right to see how the implementation of the FTA with regard to data flows impacts the conditions of privacy protection, so there is a review possibility within 3 years of the entry into force of the agreement and parties remain free to propose to review the list of restrictions at any time. In addition, there is a broad carve-out, in the sense that: ‘The Parties reaffirm the right to regulate within their territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, social services, public education, safety, the environment including climate change, public morals, social or consumer protection, privacy and data protection, or the promotion and protection of cultural diversity’. The EU thus reserves ample regulatory leeway for its current and future data protection measures. The exception is also fundamentally different than the objective necessity test under the CPTPP and the USMCA, or that under WTO law, because it is subjective and safeguards the EU’s right to regulate.

While the new EU approach has been confirmed by the recently adopted post-Brexit Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with the United Kingdom, the European Union appears also likely to tailor its template depending on the trade partner – so, the currently negotiated agreement with Chile has, at least so far, no provisions on data flows and data protection, while the negotiated deal with Indonesia includes merely a place-holder for rules on data flows. The recently signed agreement with Vietnam, which entered into force on 1 August 2020, has only few cooperation provisions on electronic commerce as part of the services chapter and no reference to either data or privacy protection is made.


144 See, e.g., draft EU-Australia FTA, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). The same wording is found in the draft EU-New Zealand and the EU-Tunisia FTAs.

145 See, e.g., id. art. 6(2). The same wording is found in the draft EU-New Zealand and the EU-Tunisia FTAs.

146 See, e.g., id. art. 5(2). The same wording is found in the draft EU-New Zealand and the EU-Tunisia FTAs.

147 See, e.g., id. art. 2. The same wording is found in the draft EU-New Zealand and the EU-Tunisia FTAs.


5. The RCEP

An interesting and much anticipated development against the backdrop of the diverging EU and US positions has been the recent Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the ASEAN Members, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. In terms of norms for the data-driven economy, the RCEP is certainly a less ambitious effort than the CPTPP and the USMCA, but still brings about significant changes to the regulatory environment and in particular to China’s commitments in the area of digital trade. The RCEP provides only for conditional data flows, while preserving policy space for domestic policies, which may well be of data protectionist nature. The RCEP e-commerce includes a ban on localization measures as well as a commitment to free data flows. However, there are clarifications that give RCEP members a lot of flexibility, essentially undermining the impact of the made commitments. In this line, there is an exception possible for legitimate public policies and a footnote to Article 12.14.3(a), which says that: ‘For the purposes of this subparagraph, the Parties affirm that the necessity behind the implementation of such legitimate public policy shall be decided by the implementing Party’. This essentially goes against any exceptions assessment, as we know it under WTO law, and triggers a self-judging mechanism.

In addition, subparagraph (b) of 12.14.3 says that the article does not prevent a party from taking ‘any measure that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. Such measures shall not be disputed by other Parties’. Article 12.15 on cross-border transfer of information follows the same language and thus secures plenty of policy space, for countries like China or Vietnam, to control data flows without further justification. So, while in some senses, the RCEP’s e-commerce chapter is built up on the CPTPP’s framework, the treaty language is made more flexible in order to give the Parties leeway to adopt restrictive measures to digital trade and data flows.

D. Conclusion

This chapter offers a mapping of developments in the area of digital trade governance with a deep-dive on some more sophisticated templates that have been endorsed in recent years. It has become evident that PTAs have evolved into an important platform for rule-making in the area of digital trade, as well as that issues around data and data flows have moved to the center stage of trade negotiations. In the latter context, one could see that states have come up with new solutions that not only provide for legal certainty for data-driven businesses but also for policy space for the protection of vital public interests at home.

Yet, the question is still open as to whether this rule-making is adequate and sufficient to address the needs of the data-driven economy and our increasingly data-dependent societies. First, it must be acknowledged that preferential venues may not be ideal in this regard, as they create a complex and fragmented regulatory environment that does little to ensure seamless data flows, may be power-driven and lacking in equality and equity. Furthermore, the above analysis revealed that the major stakeholders of the EU and the US have adopted different approaches with regard to interfacing data protection and data-based innovation, and the EU as well as the RCEP Parties have been striving to carve out regulatory space and secure their digital sovereignty. This too may be suboptimal, as it does not provide for working reconciliation.

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153 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
155 Id. art. 12.15.
156 Emphases added.
157 Id. art. 12.14.3(b) (emphasis added). The ‘essential security interest’ language has been endorsed by China also in the framework of the WTO e-commerce negotiations.
mechanisms and may undermine international cooperation in advancing the data-driven economy. The calls for more regulatory cooperation and legal innovation that manages the interfaces and the trade-offs feasibly appear at this stage better answered by the new agreements dedicated to digital trade, such as the DEPA. These agreements could pave the path towards better solutions in the domain of digital trade governance, possibly also under the multilateral forum of the WTO.